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Did South Dakota Make a Strategic
Error in Drafting Its Wayfair Statute?
By Richard D. Pomp*

Richard D. Pomp questions whether South Dakota made a
strategic error in drafting its Wayfair statute.

The Issue
Consider a wealthy couple from South Dakota on a shopping spree in New York
City. They buy $1 million of art in a well-known gallery, which packs and ships
it back to South Dakota. Does the gallery have to collect the South Dakota sales
tax on this transaction?
As is well known to the readers of this Journal, South Dakota in preparation
for its attack on Quill passed S. 106, “to provide for the collection of sales taxes
from certain remote sellers … and to declare an emergency.”1 It requires out-ofstate sellers to collect and remit sales tax “as if the seller had a physical presence
in the State.”2 “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, any seller selling
tangible personal property, products transferred electronically, or services for
delivery into South Dakota, who does not have a physical presence in the state …
shall remit the sales tax … .”3 The Act covers only sellers that, on an annual basis,
deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into the State or engage in 200
or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the State.4
By drafting its statute in terms of collecting the sales tax, South Dakota is
at odds with Bellas Hess, which involved the collection of the Illinois use tax.5
Similarly, it is at odds with Quill, which also involved the collection of the use
tax.6 Was this a strategic error?
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The 1944 Companion Cases: Dilworth and General
Trading
Under the statute, the gallery’s collection obligation extends only to the South
Dakota sales tax. It has no obligation to collect the South Dakota use tax.
Constitutionally, does a South Dakota sale exist in the fact pattern above?
© 2019 R.D. Pomp
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The start of an answer goes back to 1944 when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided a pair of cases: McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth7 and General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n.8
Dilworth involved the constitutionality of the imposition of the Arkansas sales tax. General Trading involved
the constitutionality of the collection of the Iowa use tax.
Arkansas lost Dilworth; Iowa won General Trading. Justice
Frankfurter decided both opinions.

By drafting its statute in terms of
collecting the sales tax, South Dakota
is at odds with Bellas Hess, which
involved the collection of the Illinois
use tax.
The taxpayers in Dilworth were:
Tennessee corporations with home offices and places
of business in Memphis where they sell machinery
and mill supplies. They are not qualified to do business in Arkansas and have neither sales office, branch
plant nor any other place of business in that State.
Orders for goods come to Tennessee through solicitation in Arkansas by traveling salesmen domiciled
in Tennessee, by mail or telephone. But no matter
how an order is placed it requires acceptance by
the Memphis office, and on approval the goods are
shipped from Tennessee. Title passes upon delivery
to the carrier in Memphis, and collection of the sales
price is not made in Arkansas. In short, we are here
concerned with sales made by Tennessee vendors that
are consummated in Tennessee for the delivery of
goods in Arkansas.9
We would have to destroy both business and legal
notions to deny that under these circumstances
the sale—the transfer of ownership—was made
in Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a tax on
such transaction would be to project its powers
beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate
transaction.10
The gallery would argue that like Dilworth, it was not
qualified to do business in South Dakota and had no sales
office, branch plant, or any other place of business there.
It did no solicitation in South Dakota.11 Title passed to
40
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the art in New York, where the sale was consummated for
the delivery of goods in South Dakota.
There is, however, another aspect to Dilworth. The whole
transaction, starting with solicitation in Arkansas and ending with the consumer having possession of the goods in
Arkansas, constituted interstate commerce, which, under
the jurisprudence of that day, could not be taxed.12 That
part of the opinion was clearly overturned by subsequent
cases.13 But still left open is the constitutional characterization of where a sale takes place.
The contours on what constitutes a sale might have
been expected to have been refined in subsequent litigation. The companion case of General Trading made that
unnecessary. General Trading involved nearly identical
facts to Dilworth. The constitutional issue, however,
was whether the market state (Iowa) could make the
out-of-state vendor collect its use tax. Iowa was not
attempting to make the remote vendor collect its sales
tax and was not attempting to impose its sales tax on
that vendor.14 Nor was Iowa imposing its use tax on
the vendor.
Frankfurter, writing again for the majority, upheld the
obligation to collect the use tax, and amazingly did not cite
the companion case of Dilworth, which he also authored.
Dilworth, by contrast, did allude to General Trading, albeit
not by name:
It is suggested, however, that Arkansas could have
levied a tax of the same amount on the use of these
goods in Arkansas by the Arkansas buyers, and that
such a use tax would not exceed the limits upon state
power derived from the United States Constitution.
Whatever might be the fate of such a tax were it before
us,15 the not too short answer is that Arkansas has
chosen not to impose such a use tax, as its Supreme
Court so emphatically found. A sales tax and a use tax
in many instances may bring about the same result.
But they are different in conception, are assessments
upon different transactions, and in the interlacings of
the two legislative authorities within our federation
may have to justify themselves on different constitutional grounds. A sales tax is a tax on the freedom of
purchase—a freedom which wartime restrictions serve
to emphasize. A use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of
that which was purchased. In view of the differences
in the basis of these two taxes and the differences in
the relation of the taxing state to them, a tax on an
interstate sale like the one before us and unlike the
tax on the enjoyment of the goods sold, involves an
assumption of power by a State which the Commerce
Clause was meant to end. The very purpose of the
SUMMER 2019

Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade
among the several States. That clause vested the power
of taxing a transaction forming an unbroken process
of interstate commerce in the Congress, not in the
States.16
Although paying a sales tax and collecting a use tax may
appear to be a formal distinction, Frankfurter obviously
disagreed.17
It may help to understand Dilworth by thinking about
sales as being arrayed on a continuum. At one end are
the sales made by a South Dakota gallery to a customer
who leaves with the purchased art. That this constitutes
a South Dakota sale is beyond constitutional reproach.
At the other end of the continuum is our South Dakota
tourist buying art at a New York gallery that ships it to
South Dakota. Dilworth places this situation at the other
end of the continuum and treats it as a New York sale.18
Under Dilworth, no South Dakota sale exists so how can
the New York gallery owner be asked to collect the South
Dakota sales tax?19

Did South Dakota Made a
Strategic Error?
General Trading presented the market states with a
blueprint for avoiding the constitutional issue of
when a remote vendor can be made to collect their
sales taxes—and that was to require the collection of
their use taxes. To be sure, Dilworth did not hold that
the Tennessee vendor could not be made to collect
the Arkansas sales tax provided there was an Arkansas
sale; it involved only the imposition of a sales tax on a
transaction that did not constitute a sale in the putative
taxing state. It could be viewed as having no relevance to
determining the constitutionality of a statute requiring
a vendor to collect a sales tax rather than a use tax. But
if Dilworth controls on what constitutes a sale under

the Constitution, it is hard to imagine how a remote
vendor like the gallery is making a sale in the market
state like South Dakota.

Similarly, it is at odds with Quill,
which also involved the collection
of the use tax. Was this a strategic
error?

Why should South Dakota invite any challenge at all
to whether a sale exists in the State when the Court has
already blessed the collection of the use tax in General
Trading? That case sent a clear unambiguous message,
which the states clearly understood because their statutes
like those in Bellas Hess and Quill refer to the collection
of a use tax and not a sales tax. I have no idea why South
Dakota drafted its statute in terms of collecting the sales
tax rather than following the tried and true—and safe—
pattern of collecting its use tax. Perhaps there are unique
South Dakota reasons for doing so. But South Dakota
cannot serve as a model that should be mimicked on this
point.20 Even if the distinction between a use tax and a
sales tax can be described as a “triumph of formalism
over substance,”21 under Dilworth the transaction at the
New York gallery is not a South Dakota sale. Drafting a
statute in terms of collecting the sales tax rather than the
use tax is an invitation to litigation, leaving low-hanging
fruit in limbo.
Perhaps South Dakota would win such litigation,22 but
why bother when the legislative fix is so easy. Redrafting
the statute to impose an obligation to collect the use tax
would bring this situation safely under General Trading,
Bellas Hess, and Quill and foreclose litigation (at least on
this point).

ENDNOTES
* This article is dedicated to John Healy who
is stepping down as Editor of the Journal. He
is one of the icons of his generation, whose
accomplishments are treasured by those of us
in the field. He gave so much to all of us and
asked so little in return.
1
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., SCt, 138 SCt at 2088
(emphasis added).
2
Id., at 2089.
3
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §10-64-2 (2018) (emphasis
added).
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Wayfair, 138 SCt at 2089.
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, SCt, 386
US 753, 87 SCt 1389 (1967). “The statute requires
[Bellas Hess] to collect and pay to the appellee
Department the tax imposed by Illinois upon
consumers who purchase the company’s goods
for use within the State.” Id. (emphasis added).
Quill v. North Dakota, SCt, 504 US 298, 112 SCt
1904. Quill, “like National Bellas Hess, involves a
State’s attempt to require an out-of-state mailorder house that has neither outlets nor sales

7
8

9

representatives in the State to collect and pay a
use tax on goods purchased for use within the
State.” Id., at 301 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). The opinion in Quill did not always
respect the distinction between sales taxes and
use taxes. See, e.g., id., at 314, 316–317, 329.
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth, SCt, 322 US 327 (1944).
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, SCt, 322
US 335 (1944).
Dilworth, 322 US at 328. Note that Frankfurter did
not distinguish between an Arkansas sales tax
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15

imposed on the transaction and the collection
of an Arkansas sales tax. The reason is that the
existence of an Arkansas sale is required in
either situation.
Id., at 329.
Dilworth had its employees soliciting sales in
Arkansas; the gallery did not. This distinction
would be relevant under the Due Process Clause.
See infra note 19.
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., SCt, 322 US 327, 328.
Jackson, dissenting in General Trading, referred
to the sale in Dilworth as “being clearly interstate commerce, is not taxable.” Gen. Trading Co.
v. State Tax Comm’n, SCt, 322 US 335, 336 (Jackson
J., dissenting).
Complete Auto, SCt, 430 US at 274 (“The issue
in this case is whether Mississippi runs afoul
of the Commerce Clause … when it applies the
tax it imposes on ‘the privilege of … doing business within the State to appellant’s activity in
interstate commerce’”). See also Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, SCt,
358 US 450, 79 SCt 357 (1959).
Compare Gen. Trading Co., 322 US at 336, with
Dilworth, 322 US at 327. “The question now presented is, in short, whether Iowa may collect, in
the circumstances of this case, such a use tax
from General Trading Company, a Minnesota corporation, on the basis of property bought from
Trading Company and sent by it from Minnesota
to purchasers in Iowa for use and enjoyment
there.” Gen. Trading Co., 322 US at 336.
Dilworth, 322 US at 330. This is a bizarre statement because that issue was before the Court in
the companion case of General Trading, which
Frankfurter also authored. See Gen. Trading Co.,
322 US at 336. Furthermore, Frankfurter’s phrasing
of the issue was somewhat loose. The constitutionality of a use tax was not before the General
Trading Court; that issue was resolved in 1937 in

16
17

18

19

Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., SCt, 300 US 577 (1937).
The issue in General Trading was the collection of
the Iowa use tax by an out-of-state vendor.
Dilworth, 322 US at 330.
The distinction between a use tax and a sales
tax can be described as a “triumph of formalism
over substance,” Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady, SCt, 430 US 274, 287, 97 SCt 1076 (1977), and
a relic of a bygone naive era when the Commerce
Clause was interpreted as protecting an area of
tax free trade among the states. Id., at 278. But
Dilworth would nonetheless not characterize
the purchase of art at a New York gallery as
a South Dakota sale. See Adam Thimmesch,
Darien Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair:
Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus, 89
State Tax Notes 975 (2018); Hayes R. Holderness
& Matthew C. Boch, Did South Dakota Neglect
Transactional Nexus in Its Bill to Kill Quill?
Bloomberg BNA Tax Mgmnt. Wkly. State Tax
Report (Dec. 6, 2017), available online at www.
bna.com/south-dakota-neglect-n73014472885/.
New York does not treat this latter transaction
as a New York sale even though it could under
Dilworth. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20,
§526.7 (2017). A state is obviously free not to
exercise its constitutional powers to their fullest. New York may not treat this as a sale for
economic development reasons, wishing to
encourage tourists to make large purchases at
galleries and department stores that must be
shipped. It is also possible that pre-Complete
Auto, supra note 17, New York thought it could
not tax this situation because it constituted
interstate commerce.
It is also possible that the gallery owner cannot be made to collect either the South Dakota
sales tax or the use because of its lack of due
process connections. Wayfair dealt only with
the Commerce Clause, eliminating physical
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presence as a nexus requirement. In order to
concentrate on the sales tax/use tax issue in the
text, I have deferred the due process arguments
for another day. Admittedly, this is unrealistic, a
bit like saying “other than that Mrs. Lincoln, did
you enjoy the play?”
The majority in Wayfair stated that “all concede
that taxing the sales in question here is lawful.”
Wayfair, 138 SCt at 2087 (emphasis added). I
make nothing of this overgeneralization. Neither
party, nor any of the amici addressed the issue
discussed in the text. I cannot believe that the
Court was even aware of Dilworth, let alone
was implicitly overruling it. Accord, Thimmesch,
Shanske, & Gamage, supra note 17 (“Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion explicitly noted
that the South Dakota statute imposed a sales
tax collection obligation, but the reference
seems to have been more colloquial than
technical.”). See Holderness & Boch, supra note
17 (“By limiting the scope of the new economic
nexus rule to sales taxes, South Dakota has put
up an additional hurdle in the way of the victory it deserves. The state may find that even
if it wins on the physical presence issue, it will
remain unable to tax the proceeds from sales
of products delivered into the state by common carrier, and additional legislation will be
necessary.”) Holderness and Boch dissect and
eviscerate possible South Dakota statutory
arguments defending its drafting. Id.
See supra note 17.
Winning on a Dilworth argument would, of
course, only stall the inevitable litigation
because of the ease with which a state could
cure the defect by redrafting. Also, because
the use tax would nonetheless be owed by the
purchaser regardless of such litigation, even a
winning litigant would not necessarily recover
any sales taxes that it might have already paid.

This article is reprinted with the publisher’s permission from the Journal of State Taxation, a quarterly journal
published by Wolters Kluwer. Copying or distribution without the publisher’s permission is prohibited. To subscribe to the
Journal of State Taxation or other Wolters Kluwer journals please call 1-800-344-3734 or visit taxna.wolterskluwer.com.
All views expressed in the articles and columns are those of the author and not necessarily those of Wolters Kluwer
or any other person.
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